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Abstract
We study an economy where intermediaries compete over contracts in a nonexclusive insurance
market affected by moral hazard. Our setting is the same as that developed in Bisin and Guaitoli
[2004]. The present note provides a counterexample to the set of necessary conditions for high effort
equilibria developed in Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and suggests an alternative equilibrium character-
ization.
Keywords: Non-exclusivity, Insurance, Moral Hazard.
JEL Classification: D43, D82, G22.
In a recent paper, Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] (BG) investigate competition among intermediaries in
nonexclusive markets affected by moral hazard. The work introduces necessary conditions to be ver-
ied at any (high effort) equilibrium and emphasizes the role of latent contracts. Latent contracts are
offers that are not bought at equilibrium: their role is to threat any single intermediary from increasing
his market share by reducing his price. When these offers are issued, market equilibria exhibit non-
competitive features, as positive prot for intermediaries and underinsurance for consumers, relatively
to the standard scenario of competition under exclusivity. However, BG obtain a constrained efciency
result: whenever a social planner is not allowed to enforce exclusivity of trades, then every equilibrium
allocation will be efcient from the point of view of such a planner (third best efciency).
The present note argues that the BG analysis is incomplete, and that the conditions they introduce are
therefore not necessary. To this extent, we suggest new insights both at a positive and at a normative
level. We identify an additional set of equilibrium allocations which are supported by only one active
intermediary, earning a positive prot. The amount of latent insurance needed to support this sort of
allocations is higher than what conjectured by BG (and the corresponding price is lower). Interestingly,
these situations give rise to to an insufcient provision of insurance from the only existing intermediary:
given the informational constraints and the impossibility to control trades, there is room for a social
planner to improve agents’ welfare.
We consider the same setting as BG. There is an insurance economy lasting two periods. It is populated
by a single representative consumer and by a countably innite set of intermediaries. The probability
distribution over the set of idiosyncratic states {1, 2} depends on an unobservable effort e = {a, b}.
Uncertainty affects the consumer’s endowment w = (w1, w2) ∈
  2
+, with w2 > w1: pia(pib) is
taken to be the probability of occurrence of state 2 if a(b) is chosen, with a > b and pia > pib.
1IDEI, Université de Toulouse I.
3University of Toulouse (GREMAQ).
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Trades are represented by insurance contracts offered by intermediaries to the single consumer. Every
intermediary i ∈ N offers a contract di = (di1, di2) consisting in a pair of state-contingent transfers. The
agent could buy a fraction λi of this contract. In addition, every i − th intermediary decides whether
Λi (the set of admissible λi) is [0, 1] (divisible) or {0, 1} (indivisible).1 Insurance relationships are
nonexclusive: the consumer chooses a subset of intermediaries to trade with and her decisions cannot
be contracted upon.
The payoff to intermediary i is given by V i = −(piedi2 + (1 − pie)di1)λi, when the effort e is chosen
and the fraction λi of the offer di is bought. We denote ~pie = ((1− pie), pie), and we then write V i =
−~pie ·d
iλi. The agent-consumer is risk-averse. Her utility from consuming cs, with s = {1, 2}, is given
by u :   + →
 
+, which is continuous, increasing and concave. The corresponding expected utility is
U˜(c1, c2, e) = (1−pie)u(c1)+pieu(c2)−e, where e denotes the cost of effort and cs = ws+
∑
i∈J λid
i
is the contingent consumption. In what follows, we will always refer to U(C) = U˜(C, e(C)), with
e(C) ∈ arg max
e
U˜(C, e). We also take A = {C ∈ R2+
/
e(C) = a} to be the set of ex-post
consumption proles inducing the choice e = a and B = {C ∈ R2+
/
e(C) = b} to be that inducing
e = b.
We will henceforth take the consumer’s utility to be u(c) = cγ and γ < 1. Consider the following
players’ behaviors:
i) d1 = C −W, Λ1 = {0, 1},
ii) d2 = d3 = L− C, Λ2 = Λ3 = [0, 1],
iii) d4 = d5 = · · · = dN = (0, 0),
iv) λ1 = 1, λ2 = λ2 = · · · = λN = 0, and e = a,
with C = (c1, c2) ∈ A, L = (l1, l2) ∈ B, c1 > w1, and c2 < w2. That is, intermediary 1 makes a
positive insurance, take-it or leave-it offer (indivisible contract), while intermediaries 2 and 3 propose a
divisible contract, and all other intermediaries offer the null contract (0, 0). The consumer accepts the
offer of intermediary 1 and rejects those of intermediaries 2 and 3, as well as the remaining ones. In
addition, she selects the high effort.
Figure 1 depicts the consumer’s feasible consumption set given the endowment W and the offers’ array
(
d1, d2, · · · , dN
)
.
W •
L
•
C
•
B
•
A•
0
•
D
•
c1
c2
Figure 1: Set of feasible consumption allocations
The array (C,L) is identied by the following:
1The case of indivisibility clearly denotes a situation where the i− th intermediary is making a take-it or leave-it offer.
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U(C) = U(L) (1)
τLc1 + c2 = τ
Ll1 + l2 (2)
pia(1− pia)
(
u′(c1)− u
′(c2)
)
= pia (1− pib) u
′(l1)− pib (1− pia) u
′(l2), (3)
and it satises the additional conditions
(1− pib)
pib
> τL > τC > |
w2 − c2
w1 − c1
| >
(1− pia)
pia
, (4)
w1 + 2(l1 − c1) = w2 + 2(l2 − c2), (5)
w2 + 3(l2 − c2)
w1 + 3(l1 − c1)
<
l2
l1
, −~pia ·
(
L− C
)
< −~pia ·
(
C −W
)
, (6)
where τL = (1−pib) u
′(l1)
pibu′(l2)
and τC = (1−pia) u
′(c1)
piau′(c2)
denote the marginal rate of substitution of the single
consumer evaluated at L and at C, respectively.
Relationships (1)− (6) have a straightforward interpretation: (1) requires the single agent to be indif-
ferent between C and L, and (2) states that the price of the contracts offered by intermediaries 2 and
3 is τL. Condition (3), which was not identied by BG, plays a key role in our analysis: it guarantees
that every (small) deviation associated to a reduction in the agent’s payoff induces e = b as the optimal
effort choice. The rst inequality in (4) states that the price of contracts d2 and d3 is (strictly) smaller
than the fair price under low effort; the second and the third one guarantee that accepting the offer
d1 = C−W is an optimal choice for the consumer when she selects e = a. The last inequality implies
that the only active intermediary earns a positive prot offering d1, at a price |w2−c2
w1−c1
|. Conditions (5)
and (6) guarantee that the consumer’s threat of selecting the low effort will still be effective even when
large deviations are considered.
Summarizing: given W and the offers’ array
(
d1, d2, ..., dN
)
, the agent can achieve the allocation C as
well as every element on the line of slope τL connecting C and L (see Figure 1). The availability of the
allocation L is hence due to the latent contracts d2 and d3 that the agent stands ready to buy whenever
the low effort e = b is selected. Every array (C,L) satisfying (1)− (6) is such that the corresponding
latent contracts earn a negative prot if they were accepted. The main contribution of this note is to
establish the following:
Proposition 1 Consider an economy where consumer’s preferences are represented by u(c) = cγ .
Then, for every array (C,L) satisfying (1) − (6), the allocation C ∈ A can be supported as a pure
strategy equilibrium by the players’ behaviors described in (i)− (iv).
One should notice that we are explicitly introducing both necessary conditions ((1) to (3)) and sufcient
ones ((4) to (6)). This allows us to fully analyze all possible deviations from active and inactive
intermediaries. In the following, we rst show that the set of allocations (C, L) satisfying (1) − (6)
is non-empty. Then, we stress the restrictions induced by these conditions on the consumer’s optimal
behavior. Finally, we argue that the described players’ behaviors form an equilibrium. All Proofs are
collected in the Appendix. As a starting point, we have:
Lemma 1 If u(c) = cγ , there exists an array of parameters (W,γ, pia, pib, a, b
)
such that the system
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(1)− (6) has a solution
(
C,L
)
, with C ∈ A and L ∈ B.
We now analyze the consumer’s behavior, emphasizing those features of her choices which are relevant
to analyze the deviation stage. To this extent, we refer to the allocation Cα ∈ A. For every α ∈
 
, Cα
is taken to be at the intersection between the (iso-prot) line of slope 1−pia
pia
passing through C and the
line connecting αC and αL: every Cα hence guarantees the same aggregate prot as that earned by the
single intermediary in in C. That is: Cα = (c1 + piaf(α), c2 − (1− pia)f(α)), with f ′(α) > 0.
Lemma 2 If u(c) = cγ and the allocations C and L satisfy (1)− (6), then:
1. U(Cα) < U(αL) ∀α 6= 1 such that Cα ∈ A,
2. U(K) < U(αL) ∀K ∈ A lying between Cα and αL,
3. U(αC) < U(βL) ∀(α, β) with β > α > 1 and the line connecting αC and Cβ has slope τC .
To complete the proof of Proposition 1 we have to show that the allocation C ∈ A can be supported at
equilibrium.
Lemma 3 If u(c) = cγ , then the players’ behaviors described in (i) − (iv) constitute a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the game played amongst the N intermediaries in the presence of a single agent.
The corresponding equilibrium allocation will be C ∈ A.
We now relate in greater detail our example to the BG work. BG present their main result in Proposition
2, which is stated as follows:2
If the set of consumption allocations X = {(x1, x2)/(1 − pia)u(x1) + piau(x2) − u
(
(1 − pib)x1 +
pib(x2)
)
− (a − b) ≥ 0} is non empty, then any pure strategy equilibrium with e = a induces an
allocation C = (c1, c2) such that:
(1− pia)u(c1) + piau(c2)− u
(
(1− pib)c1 + pib(c2)
)
− (a− b) = 0. (7)
Equation (7) can be interpreted as an indifference condition for the agent between the equilibrium
allocation C where e = a is chosen, and another feasible allocation on the 45 degree line, that can be
reached buying additional insurance at the fair price 1−pib
pib
. In addition, their Proposition 3 states that at
any high effort equilibrium there will be at least two active intermediaries,3 and Proposition 4 provides
a constrained efciency result: every high effort equilibrium is third best optimal.4 In particular, the
feasible set for the social planner in a "third best program" is given by the set X , and any third best
allocation belongs to its frontier.
The equilibrium we have constructed does not exhibit the properties described by BG. To clarify this,
we rst remark that if conditions (1) − (6) are satised, then (7) will never hold as an equality. This
directly contradicts BG Proposition 2.5
2See Bisin and Guaitoli [2004], p. 314.
3See Bisin and Guaitoli [2004], p. 315.
4See Bisin and Guaitoli [2004], p. 319. For a formal definition of the notion of third best optimality see also Kahn and
Mookherjee [1998].
5To show that we can in principle apply BG Proposition 2, one has to consider the point F = (f, f) on the 45 degree line, with
f =  τ
Ll1+l2
τL+1 
. F belongs to the tangent to the consumer’s indifference curve at L, and U(L) > U(F ), since F ∈ B. Using
(1) and (2), the last inequality can be written as: (1−pia)u(c1)+piau(c2)−(a−b) > u  τ
Lc1+c2
τL+1 
. Also, since τL < 1−pib
pib
,
we get: τ
Lc1+c2
τL+1
>
1−pib
pib
c1+c2
1−pib
pib
+1
= (1−pib)c1 + pibc2. We can hence conclude that (1−pia)u(c1) + piau(c2)− (a− b) >
u((1− pib)c1 + pibc2), guaranteeing that the set X introduced in BG is non-empty.
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In addition, our equilibrium is supported by only one active intermediary and this indeed also contra-
dicts BG Proposition 3.6
One should also notice that the equilibrium allocation we exhibit will not be on the frontier of the set
X , which guarantees that it fails to be third best efcient, contradicting BG’s Proposition 4.
A salient feature of our example is that every latent contract implies negative (latent) prots for the
issuer; that is, its price is lower than the fair price under low effort. The result contrasts BG’s conjecture
that any pure strategy equilibrium with negative latent prots would never be robust to deviations from
latent intermediaries. The problem in their proof appears when they argue that every deviation to a
negative insurance contract by any latent intermediary would induce the effort choice e = b.7 We have
shown in contrast that, in such a situation, the consumer will always take the opportunity of the negative
insurance contract to reach a better allocation in A, which makes the deviation unprotable.
Moreover, one can show that there exists a continuum of points in a neighborhood of (C,L) that can
be also supported at a pure strategy equilibrium.
Finally, we closely discuss the relevance of situations where intermediaries earn negative latent prots.
We remark here that any allocation C = (c1, c2) of our Proposition 1 can be as well supported as a sym-
metric equilibrium of a simpler game where two competitors (principals) can offer any possible subset
of alternatives (menus) to the single agent.8This provides a further rationale for this sort of equilibria.
Instead of thinking of (latent) intermediaries who are offering their contracts anticipating that they will
not be accepted and that they will (eventually) incur a loss, one can represent latent offers as a part of
a nonlinear menu proposed by a single principal. In this last case, every principal issues these addi-
tional offers to strategically protect his own rents from his rivals’ opportunistic behaviors. Importantly,
equilibria of this sort have been intensively examined in the recent literature on competing mechanism
games. The possibility to sustain outcomes through offers which are not accepted at equilibrium but
are strategically issued by competitors is indeed at the root of the failure of the Revelation Principle in
games with multiple principals.9
Our analysis therefore suggests that equilibria can be Pareto-ranked according to the price of latent
contracts. In particular, those allocations (if there is any) supported by latent insurance offered at a
fair price under low effort turn out to be (constrained) efcient. Thus, even though there is no general
argument to get rid of this sort of outcomes,10 it is remarkable that a social planner would never have
an incentive to select them.
Appendix
 Proof of Lemma 1
We first fix γ = 1/2, C = (25, 50) and τL = 1. Then, we consider all the solutions such that w1 = 0 and
6More precisely, we are showing that the existence of two distinct allocations Y ∈ A and Z ∈ A such that U(Y ) = U(Z) is
not a necessary condition for getting a high effort equilibrium, contrarily to what BG have argued (see Bisin and Guaitoli [2004],
p. 326).
7See Bisin and Guaitoli [2004], p. 326.
8An extensive analysis of the relationship between latent contracts in competitive economies and menus equilibria is presented
in Attar et al. [2007]. In particular, it is shown that the allocation C = (c1, c2) can be supported at equilibrium in a game with
two principals, each offering the (convex) menuMi = {µi W+C
2
+λid2}, for i ∈ {1, 2}. The agent selects her preferred
element in Mi by choosing µi and λi ∈ [0, 1]. The choice µi = 1 and λi = 0 turns out to be an equilibrium behavior for the
single agent.
9See, among many others, Martimort and Stole [2002].
10The standard notion of trembling hand perfection cannot be straightforwardly extended to games with continuous decision
sets.
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w2 = +(τ
C−0.01)c1 +c2. For (3) and (6) to be verified, one has to impose l1 = c1 + (τ
C−0.01) c1+c2
2(1+τL)
and l2 =
c2− τL (τ
C−0.01) c1+c2
2(1+τL)
. The corresponding values of pia and pib are identified by the relationships MRSC = τC
and MRSL = τL: pia =
√
c2
τC
√
c1+
√
c2
, pib =
√
l2
τL
√
l1+
√
L2
. Then, (4) can be rewritten as:
τ c 
√
l1 +
√
l2  (
√
c2 −√c1) = c2 − (τC)2c1,
where we used the fact that τL = 1. This equation has two solutions in τC , a positive and a negative one. We
select the positive one so to get τ c ≈ 0.996291.11 Given τC , from (6) we derive: L ≈ (43.6643, 31.3357), and
one has to notice that since l1 > l2, we directly have that L ∈ B. Finally, the parameter a−b is chosen so to satisfy
(2). In particular, we get a − b ≈ 0.140827. It is then possible to verify by direct inspection that all inequalities
in (5) and (7) are verified and that C ∈ A.12
 Proof of Lemma 2
1. If Cα ∈ A, then d
dα
U(Cα) = pia(1−pia)f ′(α)  u′(c1α)−u′(c2α)  . One should notice that for α ≥ (≤)1,
d
dα
U(Cα) is bounded above (below) by pia (1− pia)αγ−1f ′(α)  u′(c1)− u′(c2)  , since u′(c1α) is lower
(greater) than u′(αc1). Furthermore:
d
dα
U(αL) = α1−γf ′(α)  pia (1− pib) u′(l1)− (1− pia) pib u′(l2) 
Then, for α ≥ 1 (α ≤ 1), d
dα 
U(Cα) − U(αL)  is bounded above (below) by αγ−1f ′(α)  pia(1 −
pia)  u
′(c1)− u′(c2)  − pia (1− pib) u′(l1)− (1− pia) pib u′(l2)  which is zero by (3). Hence, U(Cα)−
U(αL) has a maximum in α = 1. If α = 1, U(Cα)− U(αL) = U(C)− U(L) = 0 from (1).
2. Let us first take α0 to be the value of α such that MRS|Cα0 = τL. For α ≥ α0, one can directly verify
that MRS|Cα ≤ τL. It is then immediate that U(K) < U(Cα) for every K ∈ A belonging to the segment
(of slope τL) that connects Cα and αL. It follows from part 1 of the lemma that U(K) < U(αL). For
α < α0, MRS|Cα > τL, and the agent’s consumption choice on the line passing through Cα and αL will
be α
α0
Cα0 ∈ A. Using again point 1 of the lemma we get, after some computations:
U(K)− U(αL) ≤ U  α
α0
Cα0  − U(αL) = 
α
α0

γ
 U(Cα0)− U(α0L)  + (a− b)  (
α
α0
)γ − 1  < 0
3. We denote τa = 1−pia
pia
. Given the definition of Cβ and recalling that αC and Cβ are on a line of slope τC :
α(τCc1 + c2) = (τ
Cc1 + c2) + f(β)pia(τ
C − τa) ⇔ α− 1
piaf(β)
=
τC − τa
τCc1 + c2
. (8)
Now, since also Cβ and βL are on a line of slope τL:
β(τLl1 + l2) = (τ
Lc1 + c2) + f(β)pia(τ
l − τa) ⇔ β − 1
piaf(β)
=
τL − τa
τLc1 + c2
, (9)
where we used the fact that τLl1 + l2 = τLc1 + c2 from (2). Then, consider the difference:
U(βL)− U(αC) = [(1− pib) u(βl1) + pib u(βl2)− b)]− [(1− pia) u(αc1) + pia u(αc2)− a)] ,
which can be rewritten as g(β), given (8). Differentiating:
11The solution has been calculated using the NSolve function in Mathematica. The code is available from the authors.
12This has been established running a standard test in Mathematica.
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g′(β) =

(1− pib) u′(l1)l1 + pib u′(l2)l2  βγ−1 −

(1− pia) u′(c1)c1 + piau′(c2)c2  αγ−1 τ
C − τa
τL − τa
=
1
τL − τa 	 pibu
′(l2)(τ
L − τa)(τLl1 + l2)βγ−1 − piau′(c2)(τC − τa)(τCc1 + c2)αγ−1 

We also remark that (3) can be rewritten as pib u′(l2)[τL − τa] = pia u′(c2)[τC − τa]. Since β > α:
 βγ−1(τLl1 + l2)−αγ−1(τC l1 + l2)  >  τL− τC  l1. Concluding, g′(β) > 0 and as g(0) = 0, we have
that g(β) > 0.
 Proof of Lemma 3
Let us first examine the agent’s behavior. Then, C = (c1, c2) is (weakly) preferred to any of the allocations
belonging to the frontier of the feasible (consumption) set. It will hence be a best reply for the agent to accept the
contract of intermediary 1 and reject all the others.
Then, we consider intermediaries’. It is sufficient to restrict the analysis to deviations in take-it or leave-it offers.
Let us consider intermediary 1. We first examine the deviations d1′ inducing a high level of effort and we take
K ∈ A to be the optimal consumption choice of the agent at the deviation stage. If d1′ is a negative insurance
contract, to guarantee positive profits, its price should be below 1−pia
pia
, since the agent will select e = a. Then,
whenever such a d1′ is bought, the corresponding K should lie to the left of the line connecting W and D (see
Figure 1), which contradicts the fact that K is optimally chosen.
If d1′ is a positive insurance contract, to guarantee positive profits it must be that −~pia · d1′ > −~pia · d1. It hence
follows from (6) that −~pia · d1′ > −~pia · d2. Moreover, d1′ cannot be offered at a price (strictly) higher than
τL,13 and this implies d1′ = d2 + d1′′, with d1′′ being a positive insurance contract which price is lower than
τL. The terminal point on the frontier of feasible consumptions corresponding to the offers (d1′, d2, ..., dN ), i.e.
W + d1′′ + 3d2, 14, will hence fall below the line passing through the origin and L, as it is the case for the point
W + 3d2.15 At the deviation stage, the agent can therefore achieve her optimal choice in the subset B, since it lies
on the line passing through the origin and L. Thus, if one takes the particular α ∈  + such that Cα, K and αL
are on the same line, then K ∈ A will be between Cα and αL. Hence, lemma 2 implies that U(K) < U(αL),
that constitutes a contradiction, since αL is available.16
Intermediary 1 cannot profitably deviate inducing low effort either. A deviation to a positive insurance contract
inducing e = b could be profitable only if the price is higher than 1−pib
pib
. The agent, though, will never have any
incentive to buy such a contract since she the optimal available allocation when d1′ is refused is a point like D on
the 45 degree line (see Figure 1). If d1′ is a negative insurance contract, the relevant price should be higher than
τL, for the agent to have an incentive to buy it, and lower than (1−pib)
pib
, to be profitable for the deviator. Since the
agent can always achieve the allocation D by rejecting d1′, the deviating contract will never be bought.
We now consider the behavior of intermediary 2 (and 3) and first show that there is no profitable deviation inducing
e = a. We keep denoting K ∈ A the optimal consumption choice of the agent, given the deviation d2′ of
intermediary 2. If d2′ is a positive insurance contract,17 and −~pia · (K −C) > 0, one can use an argument similar
to that suggested in the previous paragraph. In this case, the relevant α will be greater than 1, which implies that
the corresponding αL will be available and that lemma 2 can be applied.
13Otherwise, it would not be accepted by the agent.
14We recall that d2 + d3 + d2 = 3d2.
15See (6).
16If we now consider the optimal choice of the agent in the setA, then it should be that−~pia · (K −W ) > −~pia · (C −W ).
That is, K will fall below the line of slope 1−pia
pia
passing through C.
17The case of d2′ being a negative insurance contract is not of great interest, since the agent will never have an incentive to
accept a negative insurance contract issued at a price lower than 1−pia
pia
and select the high effort e = a
7
The case −~pia · (K − C) ≤ 0 only takes place when the contract d1 is not bought at the deviation stage.18 All
feasible consumption choices are depicted in Figure 2.19 For every K ∈ A, the agent can always get an allocation
like γL that is on the ray connecting the origin to L.20 Let us now take Cβ to be the intersection between the line
of slope 1−pia
pia
passing through C and the line connecting K and M = K + d1. In addition, we denote βL (with
β < γ) the projection of Cβ through a line of slope τL on the ray connecting 0 and L. Finally, we let αC ∈ A be
the optimal choice of the agent along the line of slope τ C passing through Cβ . For every K ∈ A one has that:
U(K) ≤ U(αC) (10)
U(βL) ≤ U(γL) (11)
One should observe that (10) is satisfied by construction, since | d11
d1
2
| ≤ τC . To establish (11) we remark that
~τL · K ≤ ~τL · M , and, since Cβ is between K and M , we have ~τL · Cβ ≤ ~τL · M , with ~τL =  τL, 1  . That
is, βL will fall at the left of γL, which gives (11). Hence, one can apply the last point of lemma 2 so to get
U(αC) < U(βL), which, given (10) and (11), implies that U(K) < U(γL), a contradiction.
O
•
W •
C •
K
•
Cβ
•
αC
•
K + d1 = M•
γL
•
βL
•
c1
c2
Figure 2: A deviation of intermediary 2
In a next step we investigate whether there is any deviation of intermediary 2 that induces the low effort e = b. If
d2′ is a positive insurance contract, then it must involve a price strictly higher than 1−pib
pib
to be profitable. The fact
that the consumer can already achieve her optimal choice at a price τ L, guarantees that such a deviation would
never be accepted. If d2′ is a negative insurance contract, then its price should be (strictly) higher than τ L. The
frontier of the set of feasible consumptions will then be the line connecting W +d2′, C+d2′ and L+d2′. Consider
now the particular α > 1 such that C + d2′, αC and αL are on the same line. One should then notice that αL
is available to the consumer, given that C + d2′ falls over the ray connecting the origin with C (i.e. it is at the
north-west of αC). One should then observe that U(αL) < U(αC), that constitutes a contradiction.21
Finally, one has to consider the deviations of all intermediaries offering the null contract (0, 0). To show that these
deviations will never be profitable, one can use the same argument developed for the latent intermediaries 2 and 3.
Indeed, when an intermediary offering a null contract (i.e. an entrant) deviates, the set of feasible allocations for
the agent coincides with the set of allocations that were available following the deviation d2′ together with some
additional amount of insurance available at a price τ L. The agent will hence behave in the same way following a
deviation to d2′ and following a deviation from any of the entrants.22
18Whenever d1 is bought, then we have that: −~pia · (K −W ) ≥ −~pia · d1 − ~pia · d2′ > −~pia · d1 = −~pia · (C −W ).
19Notice that K does not necessarily lie between C and αC.
20The availability of γL is guaranteed by construction. Indeed, we already know that adding d3 to C is enough to achieve L.
Since d2′ is a positive insurance contract, by adding d2′ and d3 to C we make γL available.
21We have that U(αC)−U(αL) =  U(αC)+a

−  U(αL)+b

−(a−b) = αγ  U(C)+a

−αγ  U(L)+b

−(a−b) =
(αγ − 1)(a− b)
22More precisely, when we considered deviations that induce e = a, it was enough to prove that the consumer always has an
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incentive to select an allocation on the ray connecting 0 and L. This will of course remain available in this context. All deviations
inducing e = b were instead blocked independently of the availability of the optimal consumption choice in B. Clearly, such an
optimal choice will not be modified by the availability of additional insurance at a price τ L.
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